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Abstract
A contest model is constructed to examine the existence of conference bias in college
basketball’s Ratings Percentage Index (RPI). Though a general RPI bias has been identified
in previous literature, this is the first study to address whether the bias is random or
systematic in nature. Within the theoretical model, the RPI is shown to be systematically
biased against teams in high ability conferences, even when all teams play to expectation and
can be transitively compared. Further, the bias can prevent the RPI from producing an ordinal
mapping from revealed team ability level to the real number line. Given the longevity of the
controversial RPI as the NCAA’s primary measure of team ability, these results may indicate
that the NCAA is serving a demand for team heterogeneity in selecting for the NCAA Men’s
Basketball Tournament.
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1. Introduction 
 
  The Ratings Percentage Index (RPI) is the prominent measure of team ability level in 
NCAA  Division  I  Men’s  Basketball.    The  RPI  essentially  uses  information  from  a  team’s 
revealed performance to numerically describe that team’s ability.  Since 1981, the RPI has aided 
the NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Committee in selecting and seeding NCAA tournament 
teams.  Thus, the index is generally valued for its ability to comprehensively and unambiguously 
rank college basketball teams.  Given the enormous monetary and emotional value of a marginal 
NCAA  Tournament  berth,  it  is  important  to  understand  the  methodology  of  the  RPI  and 
determine whether it is systematically biased.     
  Important methodological distinctions exist between the RPI and team ranking systems in 
other sports.  Therefore, we cannot develop a satisfactory characterization of the RPI based on 
past studies of other ranking systems.  The RPI as a subject of study has heretofore been the 
domain of college basketball analysts and a few empirical researchers.  With varying degrees of 
underlying thought, college basketball analysts have devoted many words toward characterizing 
the RPI.  We will invoke some of their observations to motivate the model.  In an empirical 
study, Harville (2003) finds that the RPI is a biased predictor of team performance in the post-
season.    Further,  he  shows  that  a  least-squares  approach  performs  better  than  the  RPI  in 
predicting  post-season  tournament  outcomes.    West  (2007)  outlines  previously  established 
methods for rating NCAA basketball teams.  He shows ratings based on logistic regression to 
have  a  closer  fit  with  observed  tournament  data  than  simulations  based  on  a  Bradley-Terry 
approach.  Despite these significant findings, previous literature falls short of identifying the 
specific nature of the RPI’s bias.  For instance, is the bias random or systematic in nature?  This 
is an important question, as a long-standing, systematic bias might suggest that the NCAA uses 
the measure to promote a particular post-season agenda.  In this paper, we identify a potential 
source of systematic RPI bias.  Further, we explore which type of team is hurt and which is 
helped by such a bias.    
  The RPI value for a given team is a weighted average of that team’s winning proportion 
(.25), the average winning proportion of the team’s opponents (.5), and the average winning 
proportion of the team’s opponents’ opponents (.25).
1  By measuring the latter two winning 
proportions, the RPI is commonly believed to control for a team’s strength of schedule.  Noted 
college basketball analyst Jerry Palm states, “(The RPI) is a measure of strength of schedule and 
how a team does against that schedule” (Keri 2007).  However, the measure is problematic in 
that a large proportion of Division I college basketball games take place between conference 
opponents.    As  conferences  are  essentially  hierarchical  groups  within  college  basketball,  we 
expect a strong positive correlation between a team’s ability level, the ability level of a team’s 
opponents, and the ability level of a team’s opponent’s opponents.  Thus, it likely requires more 
ability for a team in a major conference to achieve a particular season winning proportion than a 
team in a mid-major conference.
2  Similarly, we expect that it requires more ability, on average, 
                                                 
1 The NCAA Men’s Basketball Committee has recently adjusted the RPI such that away wins are more valuable 
than home wins (NCAA).   
 
2 There are two conference tiers in college basketball that are relevant to the NCAA tournament discussion- major 
(i.e., first tier) and mid-major (i.e., second tier).  Though the distinction is unofficial, it is commonly accepted that 
six of the 32 Division I conferences are “majors,” while the remainder are “mid-majors” or “low-majors.”  Despite 
their relative scarcity, majors have earned 97 of 108 Tournament Final Four spots during the RPI era.    
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for a major conference team’s opponents to achieve a particular season winning proportion than 
a mid-major conference team’s opponents.  Lastly, given the effect of the conference season, we 
expect  that  it  requires  more  ability  for  a  major  conference  team’s  opponents’  opponents  to 
achieve a particular season winning proportion than a mid-major conference team’s opponents’ 
opponents.  Analyst Jon Scott (2007) addresses this point:  
 
“The major reason the RPI is a poor model for determining team strength is because it is too simplistic to reliably 
differentiate teams and relies completely on the assumption that winning percentage is a valid indicator of how 
strong a team is.  Comparing only the won-loss percentage of the last place team of a power conference with the 
won-loss percentage of a low-level conference champion, with no regard for the schedule each school actually 
played, one would be completely misled as to which team was the stronger.” 
 
  If the RPI is conference biased, we might expect a mid-major conference team that is 
strong relative to its conference opponents to sometimes achieve a higher RPI than a major 
conference team that is mediocre or weak relative to its conference opponents, even when the 
major conference team has more ability and has exhibited this in games against strong mid-
major  conference  teams.    The  possibility  of  a  positive  “mid-major  bias”  in  the  RPI  has 
implications  upon  the  merit  of  NCAA  tournament  selection.    Though  mid-major  teams  are 
slightly  outnumbered  in  the  NCAA  Tournament,  the  NCAA  Division  I  Men’s  Basketball 
Committee may be stocking the Tournament with more mid-major conference teams than are 
merited.
3  
  In this paper, we construct a contest model of a college basketball season.  We assume 
there are four team-types within college basketball, where a team-type is defined as a group of 
teams sharing the same ability level.  A team’s expected likelihood of victory in a game is 
determined by its ability level relative to the opponent’s ability level.  That is, if a team of type i 

















= ,  where  = ) ( j i t  ability level for team-type  ) ( j i .
4             (1) 
 
 
  We  focus  on  the  ranking  of  two  college  basketball  teams,  each  of  a  distinct  type.  
Specifically, we wish to ascertain whether a more talented team might earn a lower RPI due to 
the nature of its conference schedule.  If every team type plays to its expected level and all team 
types can be transitively compared during the course of a season, an unbiased measure of team 
ability would always come up with a correct ordinal ranking of team-types.  However, we find 
that, even under such conditions, the RPI does not necessarily represent an ordinal mapping from 
revealed team ability level to the real number line.  The RPI is flawed even in the face of perfect 
information  in  that  it  systematically  undervalues  the  ability  level  of  some  team  types  and 
overvalues the ability level of other team types.  In expectation, the measure rewards top teams 
                                                 
3 The Men’s Basketball Committee selects 34 of the 65 tournament teams.  The remaining 31 teams enter through 
automatic berths.  The Committee also has the responsibility of seeding all tournament teams.   
 
4 As in Amegashie and Kutsoati (2005), the equations in (1) represent additive form contest success functions.  For 
alternative forms, see, e.g., Tullock (1980) or Hirshleifer (1989).   
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in  low-ability  conferences  at  the  expense  of  mediocre-to-bottom  teams  in  high-ability 
conferences.   
 
 
2. The Model 
 
  In this simple model of a college basketball season, we assume that there are four types 
of teams, where a team-type is a set of teams sharing the same ability level.  We consider the 
ranking of two teams, each of a distinct type.  Specifically, Team  ( ) ( ) 3 , 2 ∈ i  is of type i.  Each 
team inhabits a distinct conference.  Team 2 inhabits a conference in which all teams are of type 
1 or 2.  Team 3 resides in a conference in which all teams are of type 3 or 4.  Given a cursory 
examination as to the relative magnitude of conference schedules, we  assume that half of a 
team’s games are against conference opponents, and remaining games are inter-conference in 
nature.  Thus, a team from one type might play an opponent of the same type or an opponent of a 
different type.  For simplicity, we assume that each team within a type plays the same types of 
opponents with the same relative frequency.  Let the ability level differ across types such that   
 
  4 3 2 1 t t t t > > > .                                                                                                              (2) 
 
Further, assume that teams of type 1 play two-thirds of games against other type 1 teams 
and remaining games against type 2 teams.  Also, type 2 teams play type 1, 2, and 3 opponents 
with equal frequency such that their conference schedule is identical to that of a type 1 team.  
Similarly, type 3 teams play type 2, 3, and 4 opponents with equal frequency.  Lastly, type 4 
teams play two-thirds of games against other type 4 teams and remaining games against type 3 
teams such that their conference schedule is identical to that of a type 3 team.     
  Thus,  our  model  allows  for  the  existence  of  heterogeneous  schedules  across  teams, 
conference play, and inter-conference play.  The implication of these distributional assumptions 
is that conference play causes a team to remain in the neighborhood of its own type.  This is not 
the only scheduling distribution one could consider but is useful and sufficiently plausible for a 
general evaluation of the RPI.  Given these assumptions, we can tractably examine the RPI’s 
ability to interpret the heterogeneous experience of each team type in a setting where teams 
perform to expectation and can be transitively compared.  Given these scheduling assumptions, 
the expected winning proportion for each team-type is as follows: 

















































































































w E                               (3b)   4 
 
From the expected winning proportions in (3), we can calculate the expected RPI for Teams 2 
and 3, respectively, as follows 
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5                                                           (4a) 
 
 
Similarly,   
 
 




4 3 2 1
3
w E w E w E w E
RPI E + + + = .                         (4b) 
 
 
Subtracting (4b) from (4a), we can determine whether Team 2’s expected RPI is unambiguously 
greater.   
   
 
 










































.   
 
For  ( ) ( ), 3 2 RPI E RPI E >  the first two inequalities must dominate the third.  However, we cannot 
be certain that this is the case.  This brings us to the following proposition:   
 
 
Proposition 1:  It is indeterminate, a priori, whether  ( ) ( ) 3 2 RPI E RPI E >  (i.e., team 2 outranks 
team  3  in  RPI),  despite  the  fact  that  (i)  3 2 t t > ,  (ii)  teams  play  to  expectation,  and  (iii) 
information  exists  concerning  relative  performance  in  the  intersecting  portion  of  these  two 
teams’ schedules.   
                                                 
5 Please see Appendix A for a more detailed calculation.   
( ) ( ) [ ]
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.                                                                       (6) 
 
 
Inequality (6), which is derived in Appendix B, leads us to the following proposition:  
 
 
Proposition 2:  As a measure of team ability, the RPI value always underestimates team 2’s 
ability in relation to team 3.   
 
From  these  two  propositions,  we  conclude  that  the  RPI  pulls  team-types  2  and  3 
relatively closer to one another than would a meritorious measure.  In some cases, this bias is 





  This section presents a counter-example that reveals, under reasonable conditions, the 
indeterminacy  found  in  Proposition  1.    The  example  is  based  on  the  same  scheduling 
assumptions as those made in the previous section.   
 
Let  10 1 = t ,  6 2 = t ,  5 . 5 3 = t ,  3 4 = t .  Given our additive form contest success function, the 
implications of these attributed talent levels are as follows:   
 














































  In other words, these values appear collectively plausible within our simple model of a 
college basketball season. 
   
Then,  ( ) 5011 . 2 ≈ RPI E   and   ( ) 5021 . 3 ≈ RPI E .  In this case,  ( ) ( ) 3 2 RPI E RPI E < .  In Appendix 
C, the reader will find a contingency table that examines relative RPI values for team-types two 
and three given different values for  3 t  (i.e., the output of this simulation compared with that of 
three others).  Given the scheduling assumptions of the model, we find from Appendix C that 
( ) ( ) 3 2 RPI E RPI E <  as long as  3 t  is sufficiently close to  2 t .  As expected, Appendix C also 
shows that the bias found in Proposition 2 is present no matter the simulated value of  3 t .   
 
 
( ) ( ) [ ]
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4. Stand By Your Measure: The NCAA’s Continued Use of the RPI 
 
  Given the longstanding controversy surrounding the RPI’s validity, it is fair to question 
the NCAA’s motive in creating and standing behind this measure since 1981.  It is not a stretch 
to posit that the NCAA does not hold a national tournament to determine the best team in the 
country.  The deep field and single elimination structure of the NCAA Tournament makes this 
point clear.  If the Tournament were meant to be a sort of hypothesis test on each of the 65 teams 
in the field, with the null hypothesis being that a particular team is not the nation’s best, the 
likelihood of Type II error for most teams is almost negligible.  That is to say, if the NCAA’s 
purpose in holding a tournament were to determine the nation’s most talented team, it would be 
better served to create a multiple-elimination or series structure featuring a small number of 
contending teams (i.e., evaluate candidate teams relative to one another based on a sample size 
larger than one).   
What,  then,  is  the  purpose  of  the  NCAA  Men’s  Basketball  Tournament  from  the 
perspective of the NCAA?  Television revenues from the Tournament go to NCAA member 
schools.  Further, the NCAA is comprised primarily of representatives from member schools.  
Hence,  we  can  assume  that  the  NCAA  functions  as  a  profit-maximizing  firm  (on  behalf  of 
member schools in this case) in making Tournament decisions.  As such, the NCAA will choose 
the Tournament structure that maximizes fan interest and excitement, ceteris paribus.  It is likely 
that  the  current  Tournament  structure  achieves  this  goal  because  it  gives  the  progression  of 
games an exciting, sudden death feeling, and it also allows more teams to enter the field.  The 
latter fact encourages the Cinderella story (or the David and Goliath story) to develop itself and 
lend a touch of drama to Tournament contests.  How does the RPI fit into all of this?  The RPI 
may also perpetuate the David and Goliath story within the NCAA tournament by allowing more 
relatively unknown mid-major teams to enter the field.  The drama generated from this team 
heterogeneity within the tournament field may be sufficiently valuable, in terms of fan interest, 
to cause the Selection Committee to discount team ability in certain marginal cases.   
We can consider the NCAA’s Tournament selection decision when fans care only about 
talent as compared to when fans care about both talent and team heterogeneity.  Let  ( )
α h h t − = , 
where t is the talent level of the Tournament field , h represents the degree to which non-major 
conference  teams  are  represented  in  the  Tournament,  and  ( ) 1 > α   is  a  parameter  that  helps 
determine the tradeoff between talent and heterogeneity when selecting a Tournament field.  If 
the Selection Committee chooses exclusively major conference teams, it will not optimize talent 
level  for  the  Tournament.    After  all,  several  mid-major  conference  teams  are  deserving  of 
Tournament status.  Further, if the Selection Committee chooses “too many” mid-major teams, it 
does not maximize the talent level of the Tournament because it is crowding qualified major 
conference  teams  out  of  the  field.    According  to  the  above  equation,  talent  level  for  the 
Tournament is maximized at a point where there is some mid-major team representation.   
If the NCAA wished simply to maximize talent level when selecting the Tournament field (i.e., 
fans care only about talent level), their problem would look as follows:   
 
h
Max   ( )
α h h t − =   where  0 ≥ t ,  0 ≥ h ,  1 > α .   
 
This objective function leads us to the following selection allocations:   
   7 
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t                                              (7)                                                         
 
Given that  1 > α  both allocations in (7) must be greater than zero.   
If fan interest in the Tournament is determined both by talent level and heterogeneity, 
then the Committee’s problem might appear as follows:   
 
h
Max  = th ( )h h h
α − , where  0 ≥ t ,  0 ≥ h .   
 
This  functional  form  implies  that  the  Selection  Committee  chooses  the  field  that 
maximizes the product of talent and heterogeneity.  Thus, fans value a Tournament with more 
talent or one with more heterogeneity, ceteris paribus.  However, fans have no interest in the 
Tournament  if  teams  are  completely  untalented  or  completely  homogeneous  with  respect  to 
conference origin.  Fans might view a completely homogeneous tournament as an iteration upon 
the regular season, for instance.   Note that the NCAA Tournament Committee is selecting talent 
from a willing pool rather than hiring it.  The Committee need not pay a wage in selecting talent.  
The NCAA does pay an implicit cost in selecting talent however due to the tradeoff between 










































t                             (8) 
 
Again, both allocations must be greater than zero.  Comparing (8) to (7), we find that  
∗ ∗ ∗ > h h  and 
* t t <
∗ ∗ .  As long as fans have a taste for heterogeneity, the NCAA will choose a 
level of Tournament heterogeneity larger than that which maximizes talent level.  Thus, the RPI, 
with its systematic bias, may well be a subtle tool calibrated to produce a “fan’s tournament” 
while allowing the NCAA to maintain credibility.  As has been shown in the case of the NBA’s 
white player premium (see Burdekin et al. 2005), talent is not the only taste entertained by sports 





  Within the model, we have shown that the RPI is not only biased, but systematically so.  
The measure punishes teams according to the ability level of their conference such that type 2 
teams and type 3 teams are pulled relatively closer to one another.  This effect may be sufficient 
to cause team-type 3 to achieve a higher RPI ranking than team-type 2, even when team-type two 
is more talented, teams play to expectation, and each team can be transitively compared across 
schedules.  The presence of a long-standing, systematic bias, even in the face of controversy, 
may  suggest  an  underlying  NCAA  agenda.    Indeed,  the  paper  shows  that,  when  fans  value 
heterogeneity,  the  NCAA  must  choose  less  talent  and  more  team  heterogeneity  than  a 
meritorious selection process would feature in order to maximize fan interest.  As the RPI is only 
one in a set of Tournament selection tools, a future study might ascertain to what degree selected 
Tournament fields reinforce systematic biases within the RPI.     8 
6. Appendix Section  
 
6.1 Appendix A 
 
A detailed calculation of  ( ) 2 RPI E : 
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In other words, the RPI value for team-type two is a weighted average of its average 
winning proportion (0.25), the average winning proportion of its opponents (0.5), and the 
average winning proportion of its opponents’ opponents (0.25).  This calculation leads us to the 
following equation   
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6.2 Appendix B  
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6.3 Appendix C 
 
Four simulations under the schedule assumed in the model:   
 
    ( ) 4 3 2 1 , , , t t t t        ( ) 2 RPI E         ( ) 3 RPI E  
 
(10, 6, 5.75, 3)             .5007          .5040                     Yes 
(10, 6, 5.50, 3)        .5011          .5021                     Yes 
(10, 6, 5.25, 3)        .5015          .5001                     Yes 






Amegashie, J. and E. Kutsoati (2005) “Rematches in Boxing and Other Sporting Events” Journal 
of Sports Economics 6, 401-411. 
 
Burdekin, R., Hossfeld, R., and J. Smith (2005) “Are Fans Becoming Indifferent to Race? 
Evidence From the 1990s” Journal of Sports Economics 6, 144-159.   
 
Harville, D. (2003) “The Selection or Seeding of College Basketball or Football Teams for 
Postseason Competition” Journal of the American Statistical Association 98, 17-27.  
 
Hirshleifer, J. (1989) “Conflict and rent-Seeking success functions: ratio vs. difference models of 
relative success” Public Choice 63, 101-112. 
 
Keri, J. (2007) “Pac-10 emerging as toughest conference”  The New York Sun. Retrieved April 6, 
2007, from the World Wide Web: http://www.nysun.com/article/46197 
 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (2006, October 5) “Tournament History” Retrieved 
April 12, 2007, from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.ncaasports.com/basketball/mens/story/9033549 
 
Scott, J. (2007) “The ratings percentage index myth.” Retrieved May 22, 2007 from the World 
Wide Web: http://www.bigbluehistory.net/bb/rpi.html 
 
( ) ( ) [ ]















RPI E RPI E  10 
Tullock, G. (1980) “Efficient rent seeking” in Toward A Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society by J. 
M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.) College Station: Texas A&M University 
Press, 97-112. 
 
West, B. (2006) “A Simple and Flexible Rating Method for Predicting Success in the NCAA 
Basketball Tournament” Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports 2, 
http://www.bepress.com/jqas/vol2/iss3/3 
 
 
 
 
 